, a younger brother of a good family, either of Broughton, or of
, a younger brother of a good family, either of Broughton, or of Flixborough in Lincolnshire, descended originally from Scotland. He received the first part of his education in the country, and went afterwards to Lincoln college in Oxford: from thence he removed to the Inner Temple, where he read law with great assiduity, and in due time was called to the bar. In the ninth of queen Elizabeth, he was both Lent and Summer reader; in the sixteenth of that queen, double reader, notes of which readings are yet extant in manuscript; and in the nineteenth year of queen Elizabeth, he was appointed one of the queen’s Serjeants at law. Some time after, he was made a judge; and, in 1581, being upon the Norfolk circuit at Bury, he exerted himself against the famous Browne, the author of those opinions which were afterwards maintained by a sect called from him Brownists: for this conduct of judge Anderson, the bishop of Norwich wrote a letter to treasurer Burleigh, desiring the judge might receive the queen’s thanks. In 1582, he was made lord chief justice of the common pleas, and the year following received the honour of knighthood. In 1586, he was appointed one of the commissioners for trying Mary queen of Scots; on the 12th of October, the same year, he sat in judgment upon her; and on the 25th of the same month, he sat again in the star-chamber, when sentence was pronounced against this unhappy queen. In 1587, he sat in the star-chamber on secretary Davison, who was charged with issuing the warrant for the execution of the queen of Scots, contrary to queen Elizabeth’s command, and without her knowledge. After the cause had been heard, sir Roger Manwood, chief baron of the exchequer, gave his opinion first, wherein he extolled the queen’s clemency, which he said, Davison had inconsiderately prevented; and therefore he was for fining him ten thousand pounds, and imprisonment during the queen’s pleasure. Chief justice Anderson spoke next, and said that Davison, had done justum, non juste,—that is, he had done what was right, but not in a right manner, which, Granger observes, is excellent logic for finding an innocent man guilty.